

1 **ARTICLE POST-PRINT**
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3 The Effect of Intraoperative Distractions on Severe Technical Events in
4 Laparoscopic Bariatric Surgery

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6 **Running head:** Distractions in the OR

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30 Surgery.

31 **Abstract**

32 **Background:** Given the complexity of the operating room (OR), it is unsurprising that surgeons
33 frequently feel distracted while performing operative tasks. However, this relationship is not well
34 studied in live surgeries. The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between
35 intraoperative distractions and technical events using surgical data.

36 **Methods:** Roux-en-Y gastric bypass operation data from three tertiary care hospitals in Toronto,
37 Canada were collected prospectively between 2017 and 2019 by a comprehensive operative
38 capture platform (OR Black Box) and analyzed retrospectively. Time-synchronized audiovisual
39 recordings of the OR and laparoscopic videos of the operation were collected, along with clinical
40 data from the electronic health record. Video data was labeled for technical data, non-technical
41 data, and distractions by trained coders. Procedural steps were categorized based on criticality.
42 The relationship between severe technical events (case having 0 or 1 events vs. 2 or more) and
43 the rate of distractions (machine alarms, external communications, people entering/exiting) in
44 critical procedural steps was assessed through logistic regression, adjusting for team factors
45 (surgeons' technical skills, nurse changeovers).

46 **Results:** 60 Roux-En-Y cases were analyzed. Average case duration was 83.2 minutes
47 (SD=21.97). Distractions occurred 47.6 times per hour (SD=20.3), with most frequent distraction
48 being machine alarms (4.45 per ten minutes, SD=2.88). For unadjusted analysis, alarms (OR=1.29,
49 95% CI: 1.05-1.66) and surgeon's technical skills (OR=0.65, 95% CI: 0.43-0.93), were found to be
50 correlated with severe technical events. After adjusting for team factors, alarms were found to be
51 positively related with the presence of severe technical events (OR=1.58, 95% CI: 1.18-2.33)
52 during high-criticality procedural steps.

53 **Conclusions:** This study showed a significant association between intraoperative distractions, in
54 particular machine alarms, and severe technical events during high-criticality procedural steps.
55 Further investigation will assess the temporal relationship between distractions and technical
56 events and assess mitigation strategies to create a safer surgical environment.

57

58 **Keywords:** *Interruptions, Operating Room, Patient Care Team, Laparoscopy, Intraoperative*
59 *Complications, General Surgery*

60 **Introduction**

61 Surgeons frequently feel distracted while performing operative tasks [1]. Distractions in the
62 operating room (OR) such as the door opening, phone ringing, or alarm sounds from medical
63 devices may divert the clinicians' attention and lead to adverse events. Many observational
64 studies reported frequent distractions in the OR [2]: ranging from 6 distractions per hour for
65 urological procedures [3] to 33 distractions per hour for endourological procedures [4]. Further,
66 it has been suggested that distractions may be a contributing factor to adverse events in surgery
67 [5]. However, this relationship between distractions and adverse events has not been well
68 established.

69 A number of controlled experiments have been conducted in simulated settings, and they
70 generally showed distractions to have negative effects on surgical performance (see [2] for a
71 review). However, these studies employed surrogate surgical tasks (e.g., peg transfer task) and
72 mainly had a sole novice surgeon as the participant. Therefore, these studies do not entirely
73 reflect the true OR environment; the participants were mostly novice surgeons who had little
74 experience in real OR environments, and operations in reality are not completed by one surgeon
75 only but require extensive teamwork. To the best of our knowledge, to date, only one direct
76 observational study investigated the effects of distraction on adverse surgical events [6]. Through
77 real-time observations of 31 cardiac surgeries, it was found that surgical flow disruptions were
78 significantly correlated with surgical errors, that is, occasions in which a planned sequence of
79 activities failed to achieve its intended outcome (e.g., such as incorrect placement of aortic valve
80 suture). Surgical flow disruptions were defined as "deviations from the natural progression of an
81 operation, thereby potentially compromising the safety of the operation" and were categorized as
82 being related to teamwork issues, equipment and technology issues, resource-based issues,
83 supervisory/training issues, and extraneous interruptions. The authors found that when surgical
84 flow disruptions increased so did surgical errors; however, teamwork failures were the only
85 factor that was significantly linked to surgical errors. A limitation of direct observation studies
86 such as [6] is that observers may miss or misinterpret events.

87 Naturalistic data collected by audiovisual recordings instead of observers in the OR can
88 to a large extent overcome this limitation [7]. In this paper, we report analysis conducted on such
89 a dataset to investigate the relation between OR distractions and adverse events. The data was
90 collected through a multisource platform called the OR Black Box® (ORBB, Surgical Safety

91 Technologies, Inc), which is a surgical safety initiative that started in 2013 at St. Michael's
92 Hospital, a large teaching hospital in Toronto, Canada. Previous analysis conducted on the
93 ORBB dataset analyzed 132 elective laparoscopic general surgeries and reported a median of
94 138 auditory distractions, 20 surgical errors, and 8 adverse events per case, and at least one
95 cognitive distraction in 84 of the observed cases [8]. Surgical errors and adverse events were
96 found to be more common during dissection and reconstruction steps suggesting that some
97 procedural steps may be more critical and require surgeon's focused attention. However, an
98 analysis of the relation between distractions and adverse events was not conducted.

99 In the current paper, we focused on this relationship and analyzed a subset of ORBB data
100 that consisted of laparoscopic Roux-en-Y gastric bypass (LRYGB) operations, which formed the
101 majority of recorded cases within the ORBB dataset. In particular, we analyzed severe technical
102 adverse events: that is, intraoperative events that are due to errors and can lead to serious injury
103 or death (e.g., a bleeding event from a major artery due to the use of incorrect instruments). We
104 hypothesized that the rate of intraoperative distractions is correlated with the occurrence of
105 severe technical adverse events in LRYGB operations.

106

107 **Methods**

108 **Data Collection**

109 Intraoperative data was collected using the ORBB (Figure 1a). ORBB collects audiovisual
110 recordings of the OR environment, laparoscopic videos of the operation, and physiological
111 measurements of the patient from the time the patient is fully draped until the start of the
112 removal of drapes. Raw data from microphones, wall-mounted panoramic cameras, and
113 laparoscopes (Figure 1b) are recorded, time-synchronized, encrypted, and stored in secure
114 servers in St. Michael's Hospital. Analysts review and annotate the raw data. Distraction analysts
115 receive a two-month long training on a distractions annotation framework: a modified
116 Disruptions in Surgery Index (DiSI) [9]. Clinical analysts are staff-level surgeons who receive
117 three months of training for administering standardized protocols to annotate the technical data
118 including procedural steps of the surgery, intraoperative technical events, event severity ratings,
119 technical errors, and surgeons' technical skills. All annotations are completed within 30 days, at
120 which point the raw data is deleted and the annotations anonymized.

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
123 **Figure 1.** ORBB instrumentation including cameras, microphones, and computers installed in
124 the operating room.

125

126 **Dataset**

127 Operative data was prospectively collected from 64 LRYGB between 2017 and 2019 from three
128 different Canadian hospitals including St. Michael's Hospital. Written consent was obtained
129 from both the OR team members and the patient. Retrospective analysis of this data was
130 approved by St. Michael's Hospital Research Ethics Board (SMH REB #16-243). Case data was
131 missing for distraction (n=1) and mislabeled surgery type (n=3), and 60 cases were included in
132 the final analysis (Figure 2).

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134

135 **Figure 2.** Cases included for analysis.

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138 **Data Coding**

139 Technical events are identified through the SEVerity of intraoperative Events and REctification
 140 framework (SEVERE), a validated tool that quantifies an event’s risk of harm as well as the
 141 extent to which that event was rectified [10]. Technical errors are identified based on the
 142 Generalized Error Rating Tool (GERT) [11], and surgeons’ technical skills are rated through the
 143 Objective Structured Assessment of Technical Skills tool (OSATS) [12].

144 *Technical events* were defined as clinically relevant intraoperative adverse events that can
 145 potentially result in an injury or harm to the patient. Technical events were coded according to
 146 the SEVERE framework and included bleeding, mechanical injury, thermal injury, ischemic
 147 injury, and insufficient closure of anastomosis; loss of pneumoperitoneum, gastrointestinal
 148 spillage, and hematoma formation were coded separately. However, some technical events may
 149 be expected and common in surgeries, and at times simply due to patient anatomy and nature of
 150 the surgical task, such as bleeding during dissections. To account for this difference, if a
 151 technical event was due to the nature of the task (e.g., a bleeding event during dissection), this
 152 event was coded with a “no error” label; otherwise (e.g., a bleeding event while grasping the
 153 bowel) was coded with an “error” label, where an error is defined as “the failure of a planned
 154 action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim” [11]. Our error

155 definition is similar to the surgical error definition used in the previously described study of
156 cardiovascular surgeries [6]. Because we were interested in preventable adverse events that may
157 be associated with distractions, we focused only on events that were accompanied with an error.

158 *Event severity* was assessed as the clinical impact level of an event and was determined
159 based on a 5-point scale based on the SEVERE framework [10]. Ratings 1, 2, and 3 indicated
160 minor to moderate technical events that do not require the surgeon's attention immediately, while
161 events with ratings 4 and 5 indicated harm to vital tissues and required immediate attention and
162 rectification from the surgeon for patient safety. For example, a focal thermal injury to the
163 abdominal wall is rated 1, whereas thermal injury to a small bowel causing a full-thickness injury
164 through all layers of bowel wall is rated 5. The SEVERE tool is provided as a table in the
165 appendix. Minor and moderate events (i.e., events rated 1,2, or 3) may not require to be rectified
166 and are almost expected. However, if severe events (i.e., events that are rated 4 or 5) are not
167 rectified, they could lead to adverse outcomes. Thus, in our analysis, we focused on severe
168 technical events (ratings 4 and 5).

169 *Distractions* in this study were defined as external sources that may lead to a break in
170 attention [13]. Distractions annotated included people entering/exiting, machine alarms, external
171 communication (phone and pager calls), staff being late, loud music in the OR, and surgeon
172 switches. Staff being late (n=3 events total) and loud music (n=6 events total) were infrequent as
173 they represented a very small portion of all distractions recorded in a given case. Therefore, these
174 distractions were not included in the statistical models. As per distraction analysts' directions,
175 surgeon switches were also excluded from analysis since the switch between surgeons, residents,
176 and fellows were often not determinable during distraction labeling. Therefore, the final list of
177 distractions explored included people entering/exiting, machine alarms, and external
178 communications. Table 1 provides more details on these distractions.

179

180 **Table 1.** Description of logistic regression variables and their measurement methods.

	Variable name	Description	Measurement
Dependent variable	<i>Technical events</i>	Severe technical events	Intraoperative events that are due to errors and can lead to serious injury or death
Predictor variable	<i>Distractions</i>	People entering/exiting	Rate of people entering/exiting observed per ten minutes
		Machine alarms	Rate of machine alarms activated in the OR per ten minutes
		External communication	Percent duration of external communication relative to the duration of the procedural step
Covariates	<i>Surgical team factors</i>	Changeovers	Rate of nurse changeovers observed in the case per hour
		Surgeon's technical skills (OSATS)	Time-weighted average of OSATS item scores summed over four items selected. (Maximum possible score was 20)
	<i>Patient factors</i>	BMI	Patient's weight divided by height squared
		Previous abdominal surgery information	0: Patient had no abdominal surgery before current operation 1: Patient had abdominal surgery before current operation

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 182 *Procedural steps* were annotated as access/exposure, dissection/mobilization,
 183 reconstruction (i.e., jejunojejunostomy, gastric pouch creation, or gastrojejunostomy steps),
 184 inspection, and closure. Periods when surgeons wait for an instrument or stop to plan for future
 185 actions were marked as “no progress” (n=13 cases). And seldom, secondary procedures such as
 186 hernia repairs or cholecystectomy took place during LYRGBs operations (n=7 cases). Specimen
 187 resection and removal of specimen were also labeled if the secondary procedure involved those
 188 two steps. To account for procedural steps in our analysis, we asked two clinical analysts to rate
 189 procedural steps in terms of their criticality. Criticality was defined as the potential danger to a
 190 patient if the procedural step was done without focused attention. Two analysts rated each
 191 procedural step separately based on three levels: low, medium, and high criticality. Agreement

192 was reached after discussions. As a result, access/exposure and closure steps were labeled as low
193 criticality (LC); dissection/mobilization was rated as low to medium criticality (LMC). Because
194 the surgeon would assess the work completed during reconstruction step as part of inspection,
195 reconstruction and inspection were combined and was rated as high criticality (HC). The analysts
196 were not able to rate criticality for no progress and secondary procedure steps with the given
197 level of information: criticality of these two would depend on the surgeon's task at hand. For
198 example, waiting for an instrument would be considered low criticality while planning future
199 steps would be high criticality for no progress steps. The overall agreement for procedural
200 criticality categorization was 92.3% with free marginal kappa of 0.88 (95% CI: 0.66,1.00), which
201 is considered to be almost perfect [14]. Examining the prevalence of the severe technical events
202 across procedural step categories within our dataset revealed that severe events almost always
203 occurred during HC procedural steps (91 out of 92 severe technical events, 98%). Therefore, the
204 analysis of severe events focused on the HC procedural steps only.

205 *Surgical team factors* consisted of operating surgeon's technical skills and staff
206 changeovers to account for team composition. Technical skills of the operating surgeon were
207 rated by clinical analysts using the OSATS tool [12] for each 20-minute segments of operation.
208 Ratings did not differentiate the training level of the primary operator (resident, fellow or staff
209 surgeon) to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of the OR staff. Three OSATS items
210 (respect for tissue, knowledge of instruments, and instrument handling) were excluded from our
211 analyses because clinical analysts informed us that the ratings given to these three items
212 depended on the occurrence of a technical event, and if used as a covariate to predict a technical
213 event, these items would have resulted in a circular argument (i.e., lack of technical skill
214 assumed to lead to events, but technical skill scored lower when an event is observed). To
215 measure technical skill independent of the technical events recorded in our data, only the
216 remaining four OSATS items (time and motion, use of assistance, knowledge of specific
217 procedure, and flow of operations and forward planning) were included in our analysis. Previous
218 studies have also made adaptations to the OSATS tool, including item removals [15]. Our
219 adaptation maintains the properties of the original OSATS tool (i.e., "the behaviorally-oriented
220 global rating scale, the task-specific checklist, and the use of multiple stations or tasks" [15])
221 while keeping the majority of the OSATS items. For each OSATS item, we calculated a time-
222 weighted average using the OSATS scores rated during HC procedural steps. Later, these time-

223 weighted average values for four items were summed to obtain a single OSATS value (out of
224 20). Staff changeovers were regarded as a surgical team factor since a change in the team
225 composition may affect the information flow between members and hence, could affect the team
226 performance. Changeover-related staff traffic was already accounted for in the distraction
227 variable, people entering/exiting. Therefore, we considered staff changeover as a team factor,
228 although there could be other aspects of staff changeover that could lead to a distraction. As per
229 the study protocol, changeovers were collected for nurses (n=66), surgeons (n=3), and those that
230 were not determinable (n=12). Because surgeon changeovers were rarely observed, these
231 observations were excluded from the analysis along with not determinable observations. Hence,
232 surgeon's technical skills and nurse changeovers were included in analysis as the surgical team
233 factors.

234 *Patient information* prospectively collected for the 36 cases recorded in St. Michael's
235 Hospital consisted of (1) patient's BMI and (2) whether the patient had an abdominal surgery
236 prior to the current operation. As this study was a retrospective analysis of anonymized data,
237 with some differences in prospective data collection between sites, patient chart data could not
238 be retrieved from other sites.

240 **Data Analysis**

241 First, rank differences in rates of distractions between LC, LMC, and HC procedural steps were
242 explored through the Friedman test given the non-normality of the data. The significant
243 Friedman test was followed with post-hoc tests as described in [16].

244 To investigate the relation between distractions and severe technical events, logistic
245 regression analyses were conducted. Because 98% of severe technical events were observed
246 during HC procedural steps, only this procedural step was used in the regression analyses. The
247 outcome variable was initially divided into the following two classes: cases without severe
248 technical events (n=15) and cases with at least one severe technical event (n=45). However,
249 because one of the classes had only 15 observations, the outcome variable was regrouped into
250 two new classes: (1) cases with at most one severe technical event (n=35) and (2) cases that have
251 more than one severe technical events (n=25). First, unadjusted odds ratios (ORs) were
252 calculated for each factor of interest, along with their 95% confidence intervals. Then,
253 multivariate logistic regression models were developed. Due to the small sample size and limited

254 access to patient charting data, two models were built to limit the number of factors included in
255 each multivariate model: (1) a multivariate logistic regression model for HC procedural steps
256 that investigated the relation between distractions (people entering/exiting, machine alarms,
257 external communication) and severe technical events while controlling for surgical team factors
258 (nurse changeovers, OSATS scores), and (2) a multivariate logistic regression model that
259 investigated the relation between patient factors (BMI level, previous abdominal surgery history)
260 and severe technical events. This second model was built to explore the relationship between
261 patient factors and severe technical events to inform data collection for our future studies.
262 Multicollinearity was checked through variance inflation factors (no issues were identified);
263 goodness of fit was checked through Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests. All statistical
264 analyses were conducted in R [17].
265

266 **Results**

267 Sixty LRYGB operations were analyzed. Overall, the mean operative duration was 83.18
268 (SD=21.97) minutes. There were 1.53 severe technical events per case on the average
269 (SD=1.41), with a range of zero (n=15) to six events (n=1). Eighty-two percent of the cases
270 contained two events or less. On average, 47.6 distractions (SD=20.3) were observed per hour:
271 people entered/exited the OR 17.8 times (SD=7.80), a machine alarm was heard 26.7 times
272 (SD=17.3), and an external communication occurred 2.34 times (SD=1.68) per hour. Detailed
273 descriptive statistics for all 60 cases are presented in Table 2 for case duration, severe technical
274 events, distractions, and surgical team factors. As stated earlier, patient information was
275 available for 36 of the cases: the mean BMI level for these patients was 48.1 kg/m² (SD=8.23);
276 16 had a previous abdominal surgery.
277

278 **Table 2.** Descriptive statistics for the entire case and different procedural steps for the 60 cases
 279 analyzed. Values in cells indicate the mean with standard deviations given in parentheses.
 280

	Entire case	High criticality (HC)	Low criticality (LC)	Low-medium criticality (LMC)	No progress (NP)	Secondary procedures (SP)
General	n=60	n=60	n=60	n=60	n=13	n=7
Duration (minutes)	83.18 (21.97)	67.57 (15.73)	9.39 (4.50)	5.77 (7.24)	2.63 (1.97)	4.73 (4.35)
Number of severe technical events	1.53 (1.41)	1.52 (1.41)	0.02 (0.13)	0	0	0
Distractions						
Rate of people entering/exiting per ten minutes	2.97 (1.30)	2.88 (1.31)	3.44 (2.82)	3.33 (4.86)	3.85 (6.01)	3.17 (4.66)
Rate of machine alarms per ten minutes	4.45 (2.88)	3.89 (2.93)	8.98 (3.91)	4.17 (5.24)	10.05 (11.98)	1.05 (2.02)
Duration of external communications (%)	2.51% of case (2.18)	2.47% of HC steps (2.47)	2.98% of LC steps (6.24)	1.82% of LMC steps (5.22)	0.17% of NP (0.63)	0.52% of SP (1.37)
Surgical team factors						
Rate of nurse changeovers per hour	0.79 (0.93)	0.76 (0.92)	0.09 (0.50)	0.13 (0.51)	0	0
OSATS during HC		16.93 (1.56)				

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 282
 283 In three cases, a staff member arrived late to the OR within the first 18 minutes of the
 284 surgery, and during non-HC steps. Severe technical events (2 events in particular) were observed
 285 in only one of these three cases. In separate five cases, a team member commented on loud
 286 music. Four of these cases had the loud music comment during HC steps: one case had no severe
 287 technical event, two cases had one event each, and one case had 3 events. In the fifth case, which
 288 did not have any severe technical events, two loud music comments were made within 3 minutes
 289 of each other during a secondary procedure.

290 Rate of machine alarms, $\chi^2(2) = 63.68$, $p < 0.001$, and percent time spent on external
 291 communications, $\chi^2(2) = 24.5$, $p < 0.001$, significantly varied across procedural categories,
 292 whereas rate of people entering/exiting the OR did not, $\chi^2(2) = 4.41$, $p = 0.11$. Follow-up tests
 293 showed that LC steps had a higher rate of machine alarms compared to LMC and HC steps; and
 294 both LC and LMC had less external communication than HC ($p < 0.05$).

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Regression Models

As stated earlier, the dependent variable had two classes: (1) cases with at most one severe technical event and (2) cases with more than one severe technical events. Descriptive statistics across these two classes are presented in Table 3.

In unadjusted analysis, machine alarms (OR=1.29, 95% CI: 1.05-1.66) and OSATS scores (OR=0.65, 95% CI: 0.43-0.93) were found to be significantly associated with severe technical events. In adjusted analysis (logit model presented in Table 4), controlling for surgical team factors, an additional machine alarm observed in a ten-minute period during HC procedural steps was associated with a 58% increase in the odds of severe technical events (95% CI: 18%-133%). Further, an OSATS score that was one unit higher (maximum score of 20) was associated with a 50% decrease in the odds of severe technical events (95% CI: 12%, 70%). A Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing the rates of machine alarms 10 seconds prior to and 10 seconds after a severe technical event showed no significant difference, $W=29$, $p=0.47$. Therefore, no evidence was found that the increased rate of machine alarms could be due to the occurrence of a severe technical event. Supporting this, low criticality steps, where no severe technical event were recorded, also had a higher rate of machine alarms than high criticality steps as reported earlier.

314 **Table 3.** Descriptive statistics of distractions, surgical team factors, and patient factors across the
 315 two severe technical event categories.

	Cases with 0 or 1 severe technical event (n=35)		Cases with 2 or more severe technical events (n=25)	
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation
General				
HC procedural step duration (minutes)	67.24	16.82	68.03	14.40
Distractions				
Rate of people entering/exiting (per ten minutes)	2.68	1.24	3.17	1.38
Rate of machine alarms (per ten minutes)	3.12	2.40	4.97	3.29
Duration of external communications (%)	2.24%	2.35%	2.80%	2.63%
Surgical team factors				
Rate of nurse changeovers (per hour)	0.75	0.88	0.86	1.01
OSATS	17.31	1.52	16.38	1.47
Patient factors for n=36 cases				
BMI	45.74 (n=17)	7.70	50.27 (n=19)	8.30
Previous abdominal surgery	Had previous surgery; n=6 No previous surgery; n=11		Had previous surgery; n=10 No previous surgery; n=9	

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318 **Table 4.** Logistic regression results for predicting severe technical events through distractions
 319 controlling for surgical team factors. Significant coefficients are indicated by *.

	Coefficient Estimate	Odds Ratio (OR)	95% CI for OR	
			Lower	Upper
Intercept	8.76			
Distractions				
Rate of people entering/exiting (per ten minutes)	0.04	1.04	0.60	1.78
Rate of machine alarms (per ten minutes)	0.46*	1.58	1.18	2.33
Duration of external communications (%)	0.19	1.21	0.92	1.66
Surgical team factors				
Rate of nurse changeovers (per hour)	0.10	1.10	0.56	2.16
OSATS	-0.68*	0.50	0.30	0.78

320

321 The logit model investigating the relation between patient factors and severe technical
 322 events on 36 cases (Table 5) revealed a marginal statistical significant results for BMI ($p < 0.1$),

323 with an increase of 1 unit in BMI associated with a 9% increase in odds of severe technical
324 events (95% CI: 0%, 21%).

325

326 **Table 5.** Logistic regression results for predicting severe technical events with patient factors.

	Coefficient Estimate	Odds Ratio (OR)	95% CI for OR	
			Lower	Upper
Intercept	-4.55			
<i>Patient factors</i>				
BMI	0.09	1.09	1.00	1.21
At least one previous abdominal surgery	1.02	2.78	0.67	13.36

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328

329 **Discussion and Conclusions**

330 This research investigated the relation between intraoperative distractions (people
331 entering/exiting, machine alarms, and external communication) and severe technical events in
332 laparoscopic Roux-en-Y gastric bypass operations. A naturalistic dataset collected through a
333 comprehensive operative capture platform, OR Black Box, was utilized to analyze 60 operations.
334 Descriptive analysis showed that every hour, on average, 18 people entered or exited the OR, 27
335 machine alarms went off, and two external communications took place. Overall, these
336 distractions occurred 48 times per hour. This rate is higher than those reported in direct
337 observational studies [2]. For example, [4] reported 33 distractions per hour during 28
338 endourological surgeries collected from one teaching hospital. Our study may have captured a
339 larger rate of distractions due to differences in type of surgery studied or how we defined
340 distraction, or it may also be that we were able to capture a larger rate of distractions as our
341 retrospective analysis of recordings is less prone to missing distractions than direct observational
342 studies. In general, however, our findings support other research in the conclusion that
343 distractions are frequent in the OR.

344 In our data, all but one severe technical event occurred during high criticality procedural
345 steps (i.e., reconstruction and inspection). Therefore, our logistic regression modelling to
346 investigate the relation between intraoperative distractions and severe technical events focused
347 on high criticality procedural steps. Controlling for surgical team factors (nurse changeovers and

348 surgeons' technical skills), an additional machine alarm observed in a ten-minute period was
349 associated with a 58% increase in the odds of severe technical events (the case having 2 or more
350 severe technical events as opposed to 1 or no events). This significant relation may imply that
351 machine alarms can draw valuable attentional resources away from critical procedural tasks.
352 However, it should be noted that further investigation is needed into this effect. Alarms can
353 potentially be detrimental to surgeons' performance if they occur during a critical task which
354 requires the surgeon's attention, but alarms can also convey critical information and draw the
355 team's attention to an urgent issue. A potential strategy to minimize the distracting effects of
356 alarms is to employ the sterile cockpit rule: reducing unnecessary distractions during critical
357 steps and developing protocolized communication for necessary ones, as pilots do in aviation
358 [18]. Certain alarms might be directed to staff members that need that information (e.g.,
359 anesthesia) through individual headsets [19] to reduce alarm distractions for other team
360 members. Additionally, medical devices may be designed with modes that only alert the entire
361 team of critical alarms, thus reducing unnecessary alarms during phases of surgery that require
362 focused attention. This may have the additional desired effect of reducing alarm fatigue,
363 allowing a subset of the team to address low level alarms while alarms of high importance are
364 distinguished so teams can respond more quickly and effectively.

365 We did not observe any severe technical events during procedural steps that were not
366 deemed to be of high criticality. Further, the steps that were deemed to be of low criticality (i.e.,
367 access/exposure and closure) had higher rates of machine alarms than high criticality steps. In
368 general, distractions may have no detrimental effects on surgical performance when they occur
369 during tasks that do not require high levels of focused attention. Some distractions, such as
370 music, may even improve performance by increasing arousal during monotonous tasks [20, 21].
371 In addition, percent time spent on external communications (i.e., phone calls and pagers) was
372 found to be higher during lower criticality procedural steps compared to high criticality ones. It
373 is possible that other OR team members may have been actively adjusting their engagement in
374 external communications during critical phases of operation. Similar phenomena have been
375 observed in studies of distraction in Intensive Care Units, with other medical professionals
376 interrupting nurses less when nurses conduct critical tasks [22, 23].

377 Although we did not find a significant relation between severe technical events and the
378 percent duration of external communications and the rate of people entering/exiting, it is possible

379 that these distractions, if untimely, can have detrimental effects on surgical performance.
380 Controlled experiments suggest that pager calls and phone calls can interfere with surgeon's
381 performance [13, 24, 25]. We did not differentiate incoming and outgoing communications or
382 pagers and phone calls as this coding was not available in our dataset. It is possible that how
383 distracting an external communication would depend on these factors. For example, pager calls
384 received by the operating surgeon may be more distracting to them compared to an outgoing call
385 made by the circulating nurse. Further, frequent door openings in the OR due to people entering
386 or exiting can be detrimental to patient safety also by increasing the risk of surgical site
387 infections [26–28]. The three most common reasons for people entering or exiting the OR has
388 been identified as getting information, supplying equipment, and scrubbing in and out [26, 29,
389 30]. Interventions can be implemented to reduce the frequency of people entering/exiting the OR
390 and adjust their timing to occur during lower criticality phases to minimize unnecessary
391 distractions to the surgical team. The reason for entering/exiting the OR could be taken into
392 account in such interventions. One potential intervention is to implement a preoperative briefing
393 to ensure that required equipment is available in the OR and is functioning properly.

394 A survey study reported that surgeons felt distracted in the OR [1]. In our study, team
395 members commented on music being loud in five cases; four such comments were made during
396 high criticality steps of the surgery. Team members may have felt distracted by loud music
397 during these critical tasks. Teamwork training can help facilitate such essential communication
398 as individuals may feel hesitant to speak up in the OR if a rigid hierarchy is in place [31].
399 Actively reducing or removing such distractions during phases that require focused attention can
400 also help enhance patient safety. Through briefings, surgical goals, expectancies, and critical
401 tasks can be made explicit to the team members. A shared understanding can be formed on when
402 to refrain from initiating distractions and when to handle distractions for other team members.
403 Increasing awareness about distractions, training for non-technical skills such as teamwork, and
404 warning systems (e.g., lights that indicate when critical tasks are being performed) are some
405 other example strategies that can be used to mitigate OR distractions. However, these mitigation
406 strategies need to be carefully evaluated before implementation; the strategy must not block the
407 potential benefits of distractions (e.g., conveying critical information, reducing boredom) and
408 must not introduce new distractions to the OR environment.

409 Surgeon's technical skill (as measured by OSATS), was found on multivariate logistic
410 regression analysis, to be associated with a decreased likelihood of severe technical events, in
411 line with previous research [32]. Due to limited sample size, we were not able to investigate the
412 interaction between technical skills and distractions. However, skilled surgeons are likely less
413 affected by distractions given that they may have obtained automaticity in many surgical tasks
414 [2] and can therefore have more spare cognitive capacity. The results of [33] support this
415 argument; in a controlled experiment, experienced surgeons' were able to attend to secondary
416 tasks while maintaining their primary task performance, whereas novice surgeons could not
417 perform secondary tasks as well. Our other covariate, rate of nurse changeovers, was found to be
418 not significant. However, changeovers may disrupt information flow [34], and it may be
419 beneficial, where possible, to schedule changeovers for lower criticality phases of operation.

420 Although this paper is the first to investigate the relation between intraoperative
421 distractions and severe technical events through the analysis of a naturalistic dataset, it has
422 limitations that can inform future research. Our statistical analyses were constrained by sample
423 size. Our dependent variable was whether a case had no or one event vs. more than one event;
424 this grouping was selected as there were relatively few cases with no events. Further, because we
425 only had patient health record access for 36 of the cases, we were not able to control for patient
426 factors in the results discussed above. Although our secondary analysis conducted on these 36
427 cases highlighted the need for further access to patient data, this secondary analysis only focused
428 on BMI and previous abdominal surgery and excluded anatomical data (liver size, mesenteric
429 thickness/length, etc.) as we did not have access to it. Further, we investigated only one type of
430 elective bariatric surgery. Moreover, some of the distractions captured may have been
431 detrimental to other team members' performance, but our analysis focused on the surgeon's
432 performance. We were also not able to capture technical skills of individual surgeons for privacy
433 reasons. Future directions for this research include increasing the sample size, investigating
434 different procedure types, and investigating the effects of distractions on other team members'
435 performance, as well as capturing additional contextual details on distractions (e.g., reasons for
436 people entering the OR, urgency of machine alarms), studying other distraction types (e.g., case-
437 irrelevant conversations, missing or malfunctioning equipment), and investigating the
438 interactions between distractions and technical skills. A larger dataset can enable future studies
439 to look into the associations between certain distractions that may affect OR culture (e.g., staff

440 being late, loud music). Although the analysis of a naturalistic dataset provides many advantages,
441 in particular, capturing distractions as they naturally happen in the OR, the results can only be
442 interpreted as correlations. Experimental methods are needed to support these conclusions for
443 causal inferences. Further, interventional studies can inform the design and effectiveness of
444 different distraction mitigation strategies.

445

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450

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456

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561 **List of Tables**

562 **Table 1.** Description of logistic regression variables and their measurement methods.

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575 **Appendix** SEVERE framework illustrating the types of events identified and their corresponding severity rating descriptions on a 5-
 576 point scale, adapted from [10]
 577

Event Type	Severity Rating				
	1	2	3	4	5
Bleeding	Very low amount of blood lost	Low amount of blood lost	Intermediate amount of blood lost	High amount of blood lost	Very high amount of blood lost
Thermal injury	Thermal injury of superficial penetration to "less vital" tissue*	Thermal injury of deep penetration to "less vital" tissue* or any organ/tissue subjected to planned resection	Thermal injury of superficial penetration to "vital" tissue	Thermal injury of deep penetration to "vital" tissue to the level of muscularis/parenchyma	Thermal injury of superficial penetration to "vital" tissue causing through and through injury to hollow organ or deeper parenchymal injury to solid organ
Mechanical injury	Mechanical injury of superficial penetration to "less vital" tissue*	Mechanical injury to any organ/tissue subjected to planned resection of any penetration	Mechanical injury to "vital" tissue with superficial penetration	Mechanical injury to "vital" tissue with deep penetration	Mechanical injury to "vital" tissue with through and through injury
	Mechanical injury caused by a needle poke to tissue	Mechanical injury causing full thickness abdominal wall injury (caused by trocar with a diameter \geq 5mm)			
Ischemic Injury	NA	NA	Sign of ischemia with indeterminate nature was observed		Sign of permanent tissue ischemia was observed.
Insufficient closure of anastomosis	NA	NA	NA	NA	All insufficient closures

* “Less vital” tissues include adhesion, omentum, and mesentery (but no injury to vasculature).

578

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